The basic problem of secure bidirectional relaying involves two users who want to exchange messages via an intermediate "honest-but-curious" relay node. There is no direct link between the users; all communication must take place via the relay node. The links between the user nodes and the relay are wireless links with Gaussian noise. It is required that the users' messages be kept secure from the relay. In prior work, we proposed coding schemes based on nested lattices for this problem, assuming that the channel gains from the two user nodes to the relay are identical. We also analyzed the powerrate tradeoff for secure and reliable message exchange using our coding schemes. In this paper, we extend our prior work to the case when the channel gains are not necessarily identical, and are known to the relay node but perhaps not to the users. We show that using our scheme, perfect secrecy can be obtained only for certain values of the channel gains, and analyze the power-rate tradeoff in these cases. We also make similar observations for our strongly-secure scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lattice codes for Gaussian channels have received a lot of attention in the recent past. They have been shown to achieve the capacity of the power-constrained AWGN channel [2] , and have been used with great success for physical layer network coding for Gaussian networks [7] . They have also been used to design coding schemes for secure and reliable communication over the Gaussian wiretap channel [5] and the bidirectional relay [3] , [8] . In this paper, we study secure bidirectional relaying, where two users A and B want to exchange messages via an "honest-but-curious" relay R. The relay acts as a passive eavesdropper, but otherwise conforms to the protocol which it is asked to follow, i.e., it does not modify or tamper the message it has to forward.
We use the compute-and-forward protocol [6] for bidirectional relaying. Let q be a prime, and F q denote the field of integers modulo q. Let ⊕ denote the addition operation in F q . User nodes A and B have messages X and Y respectively, which are assumed to be uniformly distributed over F k q , for some positive integer k. They are mapped to n-dimensional real-valued codewords U and V respectively, and transmitted simultaneously to R, who receives
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where h 1 , h 2 ∈ R, and Z is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ 2 . The relay computes an integerlinear combination of the messages, k 1 X ⊕k 2 Y , and forwards this to the user nodes. If q does not divide k 2 (resp. k 1 ), then A (resp. B) can recover Y (resp. X). We impose the additional constraint that R must not get any information about the individual messages. Specifically, we address the problem under two measures of security:
(S1) Perfect secrecy: The received vector is independent of the individual messages, i.e., W ⊥ ⊥ X and W ⊥ ⊥ Y . (S2) Strong secrecy: The information leaked by W about the individual messages must be vanishingly small for large n, i.e., lim n→∞ I(X; W) = lim n→∞ I(Y ; W) = 0
The secure bidirectional relaying problem was first studied in [3] and subsequently in [4] , where the authors gave a strongly-secure scheme for the case h 1 = h 2 = 1 using lattice codes and randomization using universal hash functions. This was later studied by [8] , who gave a coding scheme (also for h 1 = h 2 = 1) for secrecy using nested lattice codes and randomization using probability mass functions (pmfs) obtained by sampling well-chosen probability density functions (pdfs). It was shown that using a pmf obtained by sampling the Gaussian density, strong secrecy can be obtained (a technique that was first used for the Gaussian wiretap channel in [5] ). It was also shown in [8] that by choosing a density function having a compactly supported characteristic function, even perfect secrecy can be achieved.
In this paper, we extend the results of [8] , and make an attempt to study the robustness of the schemes presented there. In a practical scenario, the user nodes may not know h 1 and h 2 exactly, since there is always an error in estimation of the channel gains. However, the relay is assumed to know h 1 and h 2 exactly. We want to know if it is still possible to achieve security in this situation. We study a much simplified model, where the channel gains h 1 and h 2 are co-prime integers, but are unknown to both users. The relay must compute h 1 X ⊕ h 2 Y and forward it to the users in the next phase. The relay also forwards h 1 , h 2 to the users in this phase, which will enable them to recover the respective messages. It is therefore assumed that the users have no knowledge of the channel gains prior to the broadcast phase. We will also assume that q does not divide h 1 or h 2 . For e.g., if q divides h 1 , then h 1 X = 0 for all X ∈ F k q , and hence, B will never be able to recover X. We will mostly study the noiseless scenario, i.e., the relay receives W = h 1 U + h 2 V, and find conditions under which our scheme achieves security. We will also briefly discuss achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise, but without any proofs.
We remark that demanding security in the noiseless scenario is a much stronger condition. Since the additive noise Z is independent of everything else, X → h 1 U + h 2 V → h 1 U+h 2 V+Z forms a Markov chain, and hence, I(X; h 1 U+ h 2 V + Z) ≤ I(X; h 1 U + h 2 V). Therefore, any scheme that achieves perfect/strong secrecy in the noiseless setting also continues to achieve the same in presence of noise. Furthermore, such a scheme has the added advantage that security is achieved irrespective of the distribution on Z, and even when this distribution is unknown to the users.
The paper is organized as follows: The coding scheme is described in Section II-A. The main results on perfect secrecy are presented in Section III, with the main result summarized in Theorem 2. Strong secrecy is studied in Section IV, and Theorem 5 gives the main result. In Section V, we discuss the case where the channel gains are not integral and co-prime, and conclude with some final remarks.
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS We use the notation followed in [8] . For the basic definitions and results related to lattices, see, e.g., [2] , [8] . Given a lattice Λ, the fundamental Voronoi region is denoted by V(Λ). The Fourier dual lattice of Λ is defined asΛ := {x ∈ R n : x, y ∈ 2πZ ∀y ∈ Λ}. If A and B are subsets of R n , then A + B := {x + y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B} denotes their Minkowski sum. Also, for x ∈ R n and a, b ∈ R, ax + bB := {ax + by : y ∈ B}.
A. The coding scheme
A (Λ, Λ 0 , f ) coding scheme is defined by the following components: a pair of nested lattices (Λ, Λ 0 ) in R n , where Λ 0 ⊂ Λ, and a well-chosen continuous pdf f over R n .
• Lattices: We choose Λ and Λ 0 to be nested Construction-A lattices [2] over F q for a prime q. Specifically, let Λ be constructed from an (n, k 1 ) linear code C, and Λ 0 from an (n, k 0 ) linear code C 0 , with C 0 ⊂ C. If k := k 1 − k 0 , then there exists a group isomorphism from Λ/Λ 0 to F k q [6] . • Messages: The messages are mapped bijectively into G := Λ/Λ 0 . Therefore, each message is identified by a coset of Λ 0 in Λ. We also have M := |G| = q k , and the rate of the code is R = 1 n log 2 M = k n log 2 q. • Encoding: Given X ∈ G, node A transmits a vector u ∈ R n with probability
The scheme can satisfy an average power constraint: 1
The relay finds the closest point in Λ to the received vector w, and determines h 1 X ⊕ h 2 Y to be the coset to which this point belongs.
We are interested in two kinds of pdfs f over R n :
• Density with a compactly supported characteristic function for perfect secrecy: Let ψ be the characteristic function corresponding to f . Let R(ψ) be the support of ψ, i.e., the region where ψ is nonzero. We will show that for certain values of (h 1 , h 2 ), if R(ψ) is supported within a certain compact subset of R n , then perfect secrecy can be obtained. • The Gaussian density for strong secrecy: For x, w ∈ R n and P > 0, we define
√ P (w). For ease of notation, we will use g √ P (w) and g √ P (Λ) instead of g 0, √ P (w) and g 0, √ P (Λ) respectively. We will show that if Λ 0 satisfies certain properties, then with f = g √ P , we can obtain strong secrecy. We say that a rate R is achievable with perfect (resp. strong) secrecy using our scheme if there exist (Λ, Λ 0 , f ) coding scheme having rate R such that (S1) (resp. (S2)) is satisfied, and the probability of error of decoding h 1 X ⊕ h 2 Y at the relay goes to 0 as n → ∞.
III. PERFECT SECRECY WITH INTEGRAL CHANNEL GAINS

A. The noiseless case
A key tool in studying the scheme for perfect security is the following lemma from [8] , which we reproduce here: Lemma 1 (Proposition 5, [8] ). Let x ∈ R n . Let f be a pdf over R n such that the corresponding characteristic function, ψ, is compactly supported within V(Λ). Then, φ(t) := u∈Λ ψ(t+ u)e −i x,u is the characteristic function of a random vector supported within Λ + x, and having pmf
In other words, if ψ is compactly supported within V(Λ), then φ(t) is the characteristic function corresponding to the pmf obtained by sampling and normalizing f over Λ + x.
Given message (coset) x, user A transmits a random point U in the coset x according to distribution p U|x as given by (2) , and given message y at B, the user transmits V in the coset y according to distribution p V|y (v). The density f from which these pmfs are sampled from is compactly supported within R(ψ). The following result gives sufficient conditions under which perfect security is achieved.
We can choose a characteristic function ψ which is supported within a ball of radius r = αr pack (Λ 0 ) (α ≤ 1), where r pack (Λ 0 ) denotes the packing radius ofΛ 0 . Such characteristic functions indeed exist, and the interested reader is directed to [8] for examples. If r < 2r pack (Λ 0 )/(|h 1 |+|h 2 |), then we certainly have R(ψ) ⊂ 2V(Λ 0 )/(|h 1 | + |h 2 |), which guarantees perfect secrecy. Therefore, perfect secrecy can be attained for all h 1 , h 2 for which q does not divide either h 1 or h 2 , and 2/(|h 1 |+|h 2 |) ≥ α. An interesting point to note at this juncture is that the nested lattice pair does not have to satisfy any additional properties in order to obtain perfect secrecy. The above result holds for any pair of nested Construction-A lattices, and for any value of n, unlike most results on secrecy which usually require the lattices to satisfy special properties and n to be sufficiently large.
1) Proof of Theorem 2: Fix any x, y ∈ G. We want to show that p h1U+h2V|x = p h1U+h2V , and p h1U+h2V|y = p h1U+h2V . We only prove the first statement here, and the second can be proved analogously. Let ψ be the characteristic function corresponding to f ,and φ h1U|x be the characteristic function of h 1 U conditioned on X = x. Furthermore, let φ h1U and φ h2V be the characteristic functions of h 1 U and h 2 V respectively. We will show that φ
Using this, and the fact that λ, x ∈ 2πZ for λ ∈Λ, we can write
It is enough to show that for every λ 1 ∈Λ 0 \Λ, λ 2 ∈ Λ, and t ∈ R n , ψ λ1+t
, and Supp ψ λ2+t
. We will show that for every λ 1 ∈Λ 0 \Λ and
= {}, where {} denotes the empty set.
Let us assume the contrary, that there exist t 1 , t 2 in R(ψ), λ 1 ∈Λ 0 \Λ and λ 2 ∈Λ such that t1−λ1 |h1| = t2−λ2 |h2| . This can be rewritten as
Clearly, |h 2 |t 1 −|h 1 |t 2 lies in (|h 2 |+|h 1 |)R(ψ), which is contained in the interior of 2V(Λ 0 ). Since |h 2 |λ 1 − |h 1 |λ 2 ∈Λ 0 , the proof will be complete if we show that this is nonzero. To this end, we write λ 1 = λ (0)
1 ∈Λ 0 ∩ V(Λ), and λ (1) 1 ∈Λ. Therefore, |h 2 |λ (1) 1 − |h 1 |λ 2 ∈Λ. Since λ 1 ∈Λ 0 \Λ, we are assured that λ (0) 1 is nonzero. It was shown in [8] thatΛ 0 andΛ are also Construction-A lattices, obtained from the dual codes of C 0 and C (denoted C ⊥ 0 and C ⊥ ) respectively. Without loss of generality, we can assume thatΛ 0 ⊆ Z n , and hence, λ 1 )] mod q = 0. Hence, |h 2 |λ (0) 1 / ∈Λ, and |h 2 |λ 1 −|h 1 |λ 2 ∈Λ 0 \Λ, thus contradicting (4). This completes the proof of the theorem.
B. Achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise
We choose ψ to be a characteristic function supported within a ball of radius r = αr pack (Λ 0 ), as discussed in Section III-A. For a given Λ 0 , it can be shown that the average transmit power can be made no less than n r 2 (1 + o(1)), where o(1) → 0 as n → ∞. See, e.g., [8] for more details, and for the explicit form of the characteristic function that achieves this minimum. The following theorem can be proved analogously to [8, Theorem 1] .
Theorem 3. Let (Λ, Λ 0 ) be a pair of nested lattices such that Λ 0 is good for covering,Λ 0 is good for packing, and Λ is good for AWGN channel coding 1 . Let ψ be supported within a ball of radius r = αr pack (Λ 0 ). Then, a rate of 1 2 log α 2 P σ 2 −log(2e), is achievable with perfect secrecy as long as q does not divide either h 1 or h 2 , and 2/(|h 1 | + |h 2 |) ≥ α.
IV. STRONG SECRECY WITH INTEGRAL CHANNEL GAINS A. The noiseless case
To obtain strong secrecy, we use the pmf obtained by sampling the Gaussian density, i.e., f = g √ P in (2) . For θ > 0, the flatness factor, Λ (θ) is defined as [5] 
This parameter will be used to bound the mutual information between the individual messages and W. The following properties of Λ will be useful in the remainder of the paper: Lemma 4 ([5]). For every z ∈ R n and θ > 0, we have
Furthermore, for every κ ≥ θ and a > 0, we have Λ (θ) ≥ Λ (κ), and aΛ (aθ) = Λ (θ). We will show that if a certain flatness factor of Λ 0 is asymptotically vanishing in n, then we can obtain strong secrecy. Specifically, If we have = o(1/n), then I(X; h 1 U + h 2 V) → 0 and I(Y ; h 1 U + h 2 V) → 0 as n → ∞, thereby guaranteeing strong secrecy. In fact, there exist Construction-A lattices for which the flatness factor Λ0 (θ) goes to zero exponentially in n for all θ that satisfies vol(V(Λ 0 )) < 2πθ 2 [5] (also called secrecy-good lattices). Suppose we choose Λ 0 which is secrecy-good, and vol(V(Λ 0 )) < 2πα 2 P for some α < 1. Then, I(X; W) and I(Y ; W) can be driven to zero exponentially in n for all co-prime h 1 , h 2 that satisfy 1/(h 2 1 +h 2 2 ) ≥ α 2 , thereby ensuring strong secrecy. Unlike the scheme of Section III which guaranteed perfect secrecy for any pair of nested Construction-A lattices, this scheme requires Λ 0 to be secrecy-good to obtain strong security. Before we prove Theorem 5, we state the following technical lemmas. Lemma 6. Let Λ be a lattice in R n , and k 1 , k 2 be co-prime integers. Then,
can be proved using the fact that ∃ m, l ∈ Z such that k 1 m + k 2 l = 1 if k 1 , k 2 are co-prime, and mx, lx ∈ Λ for x ∈ Λ. Lemma 7. Let k 1 , k 2 be co-prime integers, and w 1 ,
Now suppose that w ∈ Λ. We can write w = k 1 u + k 2 v for some u, v ∈ Λ. Since k 2 Λ + w = k 2 Λ + k 1 u, we have
We now claim that since k 1 and k 2 are co-prime integers, k 1 Λ ∩ k 2 Λ = k 1 k 2 Λ. Clearly,
For every x ∈ k 1 Λ ∩ k 2 Λ, there exist x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z n so that x = k 1 Gx 1 = k 2 Gx 2 . In other words, k 1 x 1 = k 2 x 2 , which implies that x 1 ∈ k 2 Z n , and x 2 ∈ k 1 Z n since k 1 , k 2 are coprime. Hence, x ∈ k 1 k 2 Λ, and k 1 Λ∩k
. This completes the proof.
Fix any coset x ∈ G. Let x be the unique coset representative of x in Λ ∩ V(Λ 0 ), and W := h 1 U + h 2 V. We define the variational distance between p W and p W|x to be
and the average variational distance as V = 1 M x∈Λ∩V(Λ0) V(p W , p W|x ). To prove the theorem, we will find an upper bound on the average variational distance, and then bound the mutual information using the average variational distance. Recall that = Λ0 P/(h 2 1 + h 2 2 ) . Lemma 8. If < 1/2, and q does not divide h 1 or h 2 , then for every x ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λ 0 ), we have V(p h1U +h2V|x , p h1U+h2V ) ≤ 16 .
Proof: We have
The supports of p h1U|x and p h2V|y are h 1 Λ 0 + h 1 x and
and empty otherwise. We can therefore conclude that the support of p W|x,y is Λ 0 + h 1 x + h 2 y. If q does not divide h 2 , then ∪ y (Λ 0 + h 1 x + h 2 y) = Λ. Therefore, the support of p W|x is Λ. Substituting for p h1U|x and p h2V|y , we have for all w ∈ Λ,
The remainder of the proof follows that of [8, Theorem 18], and we only give an outline. A simple calculation tells us that
Let h = h 1 h 2 / h 2 1 + h 2 2 , and k = h 2 1 + h 2 2 . Using this and the above equation in (5) , and simplifying, we get 
, which is a function independent of x. We can therefore say that
Since p(w) does not depend on x, we can use the above to bound p W (w) = 1 M x p W|x (w) in the same manner, and obtain w∈Λ |p W|x (w) − p W (w)| ≤ 4 (1− ) 2 . Using the fact that < 1/2, we get V(p W|x , p W ) ≤ 16 , thus completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5:
If < 1/2, we have V(p W|x , p W ) ≤ 16 from Lemma 8. Since this is true for every x ∈ Λ ∩ V(Λ 0 ), we also have V ≤ 16 . We can then use [1, Lemma 1] , which says that if |G| > 4, then I(W; X) ≤ V(log 2 |G| − log 2 V).
Since −x log x is an increasing function of x for x < 1/e, we can use the upper bound of 16 for V if < 1/16e. This completes the proof of the theorem.
B. Achievable rates in presence of Gaussian noise
As remarked in the previous section, we choose Λ 0 so that the flatness factor Λ0 (α √ P ) goes to zero exponentially in n, for some α ≤ 1. The following statement can be proved analogously to [8, Theorem 16] :
Theorem 9. If Λ 0 is good for MSE quantization and secrecygood, and Λ is good for AWGN channel coding, then the average transmit power converges to P , and any rate less than 1 2 log 2 α 2 P σ 2 − 1 2 log 2 e can be achieved with strong secrecy as long as q does not divide h 1 or h 2 , and 1/(
So far, we studied the case where h 1 and h 2 are co-prime integers. We now make the observation that if h 1 and h 2 are nonzero and h 1 /h 2 is irrational, then the relay can uniquely recover the individual messages if the channel is noiseless.
Proposition 10. Suppose that h 1 , h 2 are nonzero, and h 1 /h 2 is irrational. Let Λ be a full-rank lattice in R n . Then, for every
If A is a (full-rank) generator matrix of Λ, then we can write u 1 = A Tũ 1 , u 2 = A Tũ 2 , v 1 = A Tṽ 1 , and v 2 = A Tṽ 2 , whereũ 1 ,ũ 2 ,ṽ 1 , andṽ 2 belong to Z n . Therefore, h 1 (ũ 1 −ũ 2 ) = h 2 (ṽ 2 −ṽ 1 ). Suppose u 1 = u 2 . Then, there exists some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such thatũ 1 (i) =ũ 2 (i). Rearranging h 1 (ũ 1 (i) −ũ 2 (i)) = h 2 (ṽ 2 (i) −ṽ 1 (i)), we get h1 h2 =ṽ 2(i)−ṽ1(i) u1(i)−ũ2(i) . However, the right hand side is clearly a rational number, in contradiction to our hypothesis of h 1 /h 2 being irrational. Therefore,
We can also show that the coding scheme breaks down if one of h 1 , h 2 is a multiple of the other. These statements may appear discouraging for a practical scenario, where the channel gains are almost surely irrational. However, we must note that we have used a rather pessimistic model for the system. In practice, the user nodes do have a rough estimate of the channel gains, and the channel is noisy. While it may not be possible to achieve perfect security even in presence of noise when the channel gains are irrational, we may hope to achieve strong secrecy. We observed that if we proceed along the lines of Lemma 8, strong secrecy can be achieved if the flatness factors Λ0
To achieve this, we could use a secrecy-good lattice scaled so that vol(V(Λ 0 )) < 2π h 2 i P σ 2 h 2 i P +σ 2 for i = 1, 2. However, it turns out that this is in conflict with the requirement of reliable decoding of X and Y , for which we need vol(V(Λ)) to be greater than 2πe h 2 i P σ 2 h 2 i P +σ 2 . Hence, it seems that a different approach is required to tackle this problem.
Before concluding the paper, we make a final remark. Although the scheme presented in Section II-A may not be optimal if the channel gains are not known exactly at the user nodes, we demonstrate that there is a scheme with which security can be obtained in such a scenario.
Co-operative jamming: Security using Gaussian jamming signals: We can use the following four-stage amplify-andforward bidirectional relaying strategy: In the first phase, user A transmits its codeword U 1 , which is jammed by a Gaussian random vector V 1 generated by B. The relay simply scales the received vector and sends it to B, who knows V 1 and can recover U 1 . The channel from A to B can be modeled as a Gaussian wiretap channel, where R acts as the eavesdropper. Using a wiretap code [5] for U, we can achieve strong secrecy. User B similarly uses a wiretap code to transmit its message to user A via R in the third and fourth phases.
A reasonable assumption to make is that the error in the estimation of h 1 and h 2 at both user nodes is at most δ. To keep things simple, let us assume that R simply forwards the received signal to the users without scaling. At the end of the second phase, B receives h 1 U 1 + h 2 V 1 + Z, where Z = Z 1 + Z 2 is the sum of the noise vectors accumulated in the first two phases, and has variance σ 2 1 + σ 2 2 . Suppose that the estimates of h 1 , h 2 made by B are h 1 and h 2 respectively. Due to the error in estimation, there would be a residual component of V remaining even after the jamming signal has been removed. Therefore, B "sees" an effective channel of h 1 U 1 +Z B , where the effective noise is Z
On the other hand, R "sees" the effective channel h 1 U 1 + Z , where Z = Z 1 + h 2 V 1 . It can be shown that [5] using the lattice Gaussian distribution for randomization, i.e., p U1|X
given by (2) with f = g √ P , a rate of 1 4 log 2 1 + h 2 1 P 2δ 2 P +σ 2 − 1 4 log 2 1 + h 2 1 P h 2 2 P +σ 2 1 − 1 2 log 2 e can be achieved by A with strong secrecy.
